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Introduction
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." This clause has been
described as "constitutional boilerplate."1 Mr. Justice Story suggested
that "the provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free gov-
ernment, since it is scarcely possible, that any department of such a gov-
ernment should authorize, or justify such atrocious conduct."
'2
Nevertheless, convicted persons repeatedly have invoked the protection
of this express prohibition of cruel punishments in challenging the legiti-
macy of long prison terms for offenses perceived to be minor, innovative
punishments, prison confinement under grossly debilitating conditions,
and, perhaps most importantly, the death penalty. These challenges
have forced judges to supply content to the words of the Eighth
Amendment.
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" does not, on its face,
describe any discrete set of readily ascertainable penalties. It does not
have any "natural and proper" meaning. 3 Rather, it is a label for a
moral concept we call "cruelty." Giving concrete meaning to the cruel
and unusual punishments clause is a process of clarifying the values as-
sociated with the constitutional concept of cruelty and applying them to
particular cases.4 At the Eighth Amendment's present stage of develop-
ment, the Court has not reached any real consensus on several points:
whose moral judgments define the constitutional ban on cruel punish-
ments; what methodology should be used for discovering the relevant
moral judgments; and whether the questions raised by the cruel and
unusual punishments cases are questions of morality that are not suscep-
tible to resolution by deduction. The cases reveal a Court which re-
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1982.
1. Granucci, "Nor Cruel or Unusual Punishments Infhcted'" The Original Meaning, 57, CALIF.
L. REV. 839, 840 (1960).
2. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 750 (Cam-
bridge, 1833).
3. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW, 23 (1980).
4. See Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term - The Forms ofjustzte, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 36, 42
(1979); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 135-36 (1977).
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mains in the throes of an agonizing debate over substantive
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. A few of the Justices have
accepted the responsibility of trying to articulate the constituent ele-
ments of the concept of cruelty in order to produce a rational definition
of appropriate prohibitions. 5 Others, attempting to avoid embroilment
in a debate over moral philosophy or penal theory, have sought "objec-
tive" tests of cruelty whose applications are often characterized by heavy
reliance on empirical evidence. 6 And some have focused on the proce-
dural regularity with which punishments are inflicted, perhaps in an
attempt to induce governmental bodies to debate and articulate the sub-
stantive moral choices.
7
The majority of Eighth Amendment opinions above focus more on
different theories of judicial review, transcending the cruel and unusual
punishments clause, than on disagreements unique to that clause. This
is because many of the Court's struggles, thus far, have concerned
threshold questions. The debate over the appropriate judicial role is
relatively developed. The debate over substantive moral principles is
not.8
This article analyzes Supreme Court attempts to articulate standards
for review in terms of the various Justices' views of their own role in the
decision-making process. Furthermore, the article specifically addresses
the death penalty, which offers a particularly emotionally charged con-
text in which to consider the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment.
As the states begin not only to reenact capital punishment legislation,
but also to resume the practice of execution, it is important to consider
the jurisprudence that makes these developments possible.9 Individual
5. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring); id. at
314 (Marshall, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan J., dis-
senting); Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J. dissenting); Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 604 (1977) (Burger, C.J. dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 308 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (Rehnquist, J.).
7. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310
(White, J., concurring) Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (plurality opinion); McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. The court is so splintered with respect to the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny and
the legitimate sources of law to be applied to Eighth Amendment cases that most of the
published debate centers around these questions. Several opposing positions have been
clearly articulated. On the current court, only Justices Brennan and Marshall have been
willing to examine the moral principles underlying the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
They do not engage in the same type of textual and empirical interpretation as Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Although the debate is polarized, the only meaningful dia-
logue between the Court's members concerns the appropriate role of judges in interpreting
the Eighth Amendment. The Justices' applications of their various chosen methodologies are
informative, but they do not address each other. Therefore, this discussion is organized
around the opposing views of the judge's proper role.
9. The death penalty is a special case. Indeed, the emotion surrounding the capital pun-
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opinions are considered from the perspective of judicial motive and role
identification, in an effort to suggest explanations for the Justices' differ-
ent conceptions of their roles. Opinions evidencing a common judicial
role are considered together according to categories based on the Jus-
tices' own perceptions of their roles in the process of societal value clari-
fication. The concluding section discusses which approach is most
appropriate for Eighth Amendment adjudication in capital punishment
cases. The opinions are grouped in the following categories discussed in
order of increasing judicial activity: (1) Empirical approaches, includ-
ing historical and contemporary public opinion analysis; (2) Procedural
approaches not directly concerned with the substance of the ban on
cruel and unusual punishments; and (3) Independent approaches seek-
ing both to identify core principles underlying the cruel and unusual
punishments clause and to apply those principles to current cases.
I. Judicial Restra'nt. The Search for an Empirical Defniit'on
For some of the Supreme Court Justices, judicial "objectivity," or per-
haps more accurately judicial "restraint," is of primary importance.' 0
They believe that the judiciary should never make independent substan-
tive choices. They see the legitimacy of judicial action as being depen-
dent on the Justices' willingness and ability to interpose barriers
between their personal preferences and their interpretations of the Con-
stitution. The judicial function, according to this view, is to enforce the
substantive choices made by other institutional decisionmakers, not to
analyze moral dilemmas from first principles. Legitimate sources of de-
cision are all external--constitutional text, constitutional history, judi-
cial precedent, legislative action, or contemporary public opinion.
Consequently, the process of judging becomes heavily dependent on em-
pirical research. This view of the judicial purpose has led to several
different but related approaches to the cruel and unusual punishments
clause in death penalty cases.
ishment debate may distort judicial analysis, and may make the cases in certain respects
anomalous relative to general body of Eighth Amendment literature. Nevertheless, the ana-
lytic framework developed in this paper attempts to be sufficiently broad to have application
to the analysis of cruel and unusual cases other than those involving the death penalty.
10. This judicial view seeks to depersonalize the judging process in order to avoid deci-
sions representing nothing but the whims of individuals. Although the methods chosen by
these Justices may not be the only alternatives to standardless subjectivity, they often denomi-
nate their approaches "objective," implying that all others are "subjective" and therefore
inappropriate. In order to circumvent this problem, the "objective"/"subjective" terminol-
ogy will be avoided here.
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A. The Historical Approach
The first of the empirical approaches is the historical approach. Sub-
scribers to this view would define the Eighth Amendment by the punish-
ments that its authors sought to prohibit when they added that
amendment to the Constitution. Historical evidence is the key to this
approach. Although the legislative history of the cruel and unusual
punishments clause is sparse, the evidence points to an intent to prohibit
physically torturous punishments, such as the rack, drawing and quar-
tering, breaking on the wheel, crucifixion and similar tortures practiced
in Stuart, England."
Early Supreme Court opinions interpreting the cruel and unusual
punishments clause applied the historical approach and rejected several
Eighth Amendment challenges. For example, in Wtdkerson v. Utah,'12 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of shooting as a method of carrying
out a death sentence. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that
shooting had long been a common mode of execution under military
law. In defining the scope of the Eighth Amendment, the Court said
only that
Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of
the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punish-
ments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments such
as [the Stuart tortures catalogued by Blackstone] and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the
11. For example, Mr. Holmes protested in the Massachusetts convention that:
[Congress is] nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punish-
ments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but
that racks and gibblets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline. 2 J.
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION I II (Philadelphia, 1866) (emphasis in orginal).
And in the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry insisted that:
[W]hen we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the
virtue of representatives.
, , , In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction
of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unu-
sual punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distin-
guished our ancestors? - That they would not admit to tortures, or cruel and barbarous
punishment. 3 id. at 447.
The Congressional debate on the proposed Eighth Amendment proceeded as follows:
Mr. Smith of South Carolina objected to the words "nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments;" the import of them being too indefinite. Mr. Livermore, of New Hampshire:
"The Clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no
objection to it; but it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it is necessary. ...
No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a
man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in
the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?, 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 782-3 U. Gales ed. 1789). See generally Granucci, supra note 1.
12. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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Constitution. t 3
The historical approach has not commanded a majority of the Court
in more recent capital punishment cases. It has maintained some adher-
ents, however. Justice Black, for example, concurring in McCautha v.
Califomia 14 argued that the words of the Eighth Amendment
... cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty
was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from
which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is
inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punishment
by the Amendment.' 5
Under the historical approach, constitutional interpretation becomes
a search for the subjective intent of the Framers. If the clause embodies
a moral condemnation of cruelty, cruelty is defined with reference to the
Framers' moral standards, not the personal beliefs of the Justices, or of a
contemporary majority of the American people. The tools of this type
of interpretation are impersonal-historical research and linguistic anal-
ysis of the constitutional text. With respect to the death penalty, the
widespread authorization of capital punishment at the time the Eighth
Amendment was adopted, the absence of any statement in the legisla-
tive history indicating an intent to abolish capital punishment, and the
textual references to capital punishment in other parts of the Constitu-
tion' 6 lead inescapably to the conclusion that the Framers contemplated
the continued use of the death penalty as a criminal sanction.
The historical process of interpretation is appealing for several rea-
sons. First, the focus on historical evidence and the words of the Consti-
tution frees the justices from possible accusations that they have
injected their personal beliefs into the Constitution.' 7 Whatever role
one envisions for the courts, it is generally accepted that federal judges
are expected to be expounders of constitutional values, not political ac-
tors seeking to infuse their idiosyncratic beliefs into law. Although ac-
ceptance of the Framers' wishes is not the only alternative to
unprincipled political action by judges, it is one clear alternative. Like
13. Id. at 135-36.
14. 402 U.S. 183, 225 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 226. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (White, J.,
dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
.... nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law... Similarly,
the Fourteenth Amendment provides that ". . . no State shall ... deprive any person of the
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
17. The Justices are also freed from direct blame for the beliefs and from the difficult task
of justifying often controversial moral judgments.
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every other approach to judicial decision-making, it is, of course, subject
to the personal beliefs of the Justice since personal beliefs will partially
determine which empirical evidence is convincing to a particular Jus-
tice. The limited, factual nature of the relevant evidence leaves less
room for personalities to intrude than do many other approaches,
however.
Further, by posing an historical question and then focusing on histori-
cal evidence, the Justices increase the likelihood that they will find a
conclusive answer to the question before them. By choosing a question
that has a discoverable (but not necessarily relevant) answer, they pre-
serve the judicial myth that law is discovered, not made; that the words
of the Constitution have natural and proper meanings which the Jus-
tices retrieve from obscurity and express with mathematical certainty;
that right and wrong in law are analogous to right and wrong in science.
Although the myth is false, it nevertheless persists. It provides judges
with a sense of security-an escape from acknowledgement of their
power to choose among competing values and to impose their will.
The myth also reassures the public about the role of judges. If judges
are seen as passive mouthpieces for static law, then they need not be
feared. Indeed they become expositors of certainty in a confused world,
and thus allay fears bred of confusion. 8 On the other hand, if judges
are viewed as usurpers whenever their creative role becomes obvious, the
myth itself poses a danger. It cannot possibily be fulfilled, yet we de-
mand that judges strive to fulfill it. Inevitably, they confuse the law in
an effort to assume an impossible role.
Although historical analysis may often provide a simple and definitive
answer, the historical meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause, namely which punishments the Framers intended to prohibit,
may not be readily discernible. Collective psychological states in gen-
eral, and two hundred year old psychological states, in particular, are
not susceptible to rigorous proof. Nevertheless, the question may be eas-
ier to answer than one directed at defining the moral concept of cruelty.
It is also in a form that supports the myth-it searches for an intent
which has become obscured with time in order to reaffirm the meaning
of a law which has not changed.
Finally, in the case of the cruel and unusual punishments clause, ac-
ceptance of the historical approach can serve to avoid conflict with the
majoritarian branches of government. Although the moral beliefs of the
eighteenth century Constitutional Framers are not necessarily closer to
the beliefs of the contemporary popular majority than are the beliefs of
18. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 13-21 (1936).
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present day judges, acceptance of the Framers' standards for punish-
ment legitimates all penalties short of physical torture. So, while the
people may be more tolerant of a court striking down democratically
enacted statutes as violative of five Justices personal beliefs than they
would be of a court striking down the same statutes as violative of two
hundred year old moral standards long rejected by American society,
the reality in this area is that application of the historical approach le-
gitimates governmental action.
This reality, however, reveals the inadequacy of history as a guiding
principle for interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
Conceptions of cruelty, like all moral values, may change over time. If
the American notion of cruelty has changed since the end of the eight-
eenth century, the Framers' definition ceases to be a very good index of
what is now cruel. In fact, our conception of cruelty has changed. Some
punishments routinely inflicted in the eighteenth century and not con-
sidered cruel, whipping and pillorying 19 for example, undoubtedly
would be viewed as cruel today. Tying the constitutional prohibition of
cruelty to its eighteenth century conception legitimates the infliction of
punishments now acknowledged to be cruel and authorizes legislatures
to act cruelly. The only limitation on such legislative action would be
that it must take the form of a previously acceptable punishment.
Adoption of the historical approach, therefore, leads to the conclusion
that the Eighth Amendment is meaningless, unnecessary and obsolete.
Moreover, although the Framers' definition of cruelty is reasonably
clear, it is not clear that they intended to enact a static ban on certain
specific punishments. If they intended the Eighth Amendment to be
limited to physical torture, why does it proscribe cruel and unusual pun-
ishments in such general language? The intent may have been to pro-
hibit the concept of cruel punishments, allowing the constitutional
definition of cruelty to change as the societal conception of cruelty
changed over time, and as previously unimagined cases arose. If so, the
Framers' subjective conceptions of cruelty are as irrelevant as the Jus-
tices' preferences. The Court must then reject the eighteenth century
standard which has been outgrown in order to apply the general con-
cept to new cases and give effect to the broader goal of the same Framers
- to prohibit government from acting cruelly, even toward persons con-
victed of crimes.
20
19. "Pillory-a frame erected on a pillary and made with holes and movable boards,
through which the heads and hands of criminals were put." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305
(4th ed. 1968). See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., dissenting), citing Jackson
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
20. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 135-36 (1977); Radin, The Juriprudence of
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B. Contemporary Consensus
An obvious alternative to the historical approach is an analysis linked
to contemporary popular consensus. In several of the recent death pen-
alty cases, some members of the Court have sought to develop a method
of Eighth Amendment analysis which transcends the limitations of his-
tory without abandoning the ideal of "objectivity" expressed in empiri-
cal verifiability. These Justices, like those subscribing to the historical
approach, absolutely refuse to inject themselves into the substantive de-
cision-making process. Rather than accepting the substantive moral
choices of the constitutional Framers, however, they attempt to apply
the moral standards of the present American society, as revealed
through "objective indicia." This approach relies on legislative behav-
ior, jury behavior and public opinion polls to capture a contemporary
popular notion of cruelty.
The two clearest examples of Supreme Court opinions basing the defi-
nition of cruelty on contemporary public opinion are Gregg v. Georgia
2'
and Coker v. Georgia.22 Both involve the Georgia death penalty statute.
In Gregg the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty for
murder, at least under the procedural safeguards of the Georgia stat-
ute,23 concluding that the use of capital punishment was not in all cases
repugnant to the moral standards of the American people today. The
Court relied heavily on the fact that, since Furman v. Georgia24 invali-
dated capital punishment statues which allowed for unfettered jury dis-
cretion in choosing whether to impose the death penalty,2 5 thirty-five
state legislatures and Congress had reenacted death penalty statutes ap-
plicable to some crimes. The plurality argued that it was inconceivable
that capital punishment violated the American people's notion of cru-
elty when so many legislatures, in reconsidering the issue, had recently
reenacted capital punishment statutes.
In Coker, the Court applied a similar line of reasoning to hold the
death penalty unconstitutional when inflicted as punishment for the
rape of an adult woman. In contrast to the ubiquity of the post-Furman
Death. Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989,
1031-33 (1978).
21. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
22. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
23. See in/ia pp. 58-60.
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25. Each member of the Court filed a separate opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall
concluded that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment per se, and thus was
prohibited absolutely. Justice Douglas, Stewart and White held the death penalty unconsti-
tutional as applied under the statutes before the Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist dissented. See infia pp. 54-56.
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statutes authorizing the death penalty for murder, only three state legis-
latures had prescribed the death penalty for rape in the wake of Furman.
No state which had not previously imposed capital punishment for rape
did so after Furman, and several states dropped rape from their list of
capital offenses. In addition, two of the three state statutes authorizing
the death penalty for rape had been invalidated because they imposed
mandatory death sentences on those convicted. 26 Hence, Georgia was
left with the only operative capital punishment statute applicable to
rape. The Court also considered the behavior of Georgia juries under
the statute and was impressed by the fact that in nine out of ten rape
cases juries had not voted to impose the death penalty. Based on this
evidence of popular opinion, the Court held that capital punishment is
disproportionate 27 to the crime of raping an adult woman, and is there-
fore repugnant to the Eighth Amendment.
Although adopted with the commendable objective of avoiding the
stranglehold of historical interpretation, this type of analysis is not ac-
ceptable. Instead of accepting the moral judgments of the past, it ac-
cepts the moral judgments of the present majority. This ignores the very
purpose of constitutional safeguards - to prevent a temporal majority
from imposing its will in violation of the constitutional principles agreed
upon in advance. To allow the Court to assign the job of defining the
Eighth Amendment constitutional right to those whose activity the Con-
stitution seeks to restrain is to emasculate that right entirely.28
In both Gregg and Coker the Court denied that it was abdicating its
decision-making authority to the popular will.2 9 It claimed to be using
objective indicia of popular opinion as evidence of contemporary moral
standards on which it can base its own determination of the bounds of
26. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976); see bzfa p. 61-62.
27. See discussion of the proportionality principle in Coker infa p. 55.
28. Were wide acceptance - measured by statutory authorization or public opinion
polls - enough to authorize a punishment, the clause would indeed be "drained of any
independent integrity as a governing normative principle." Like no other constitutional
provision, its only function would be to legitimize advances already made by the other
departments and opinions already the conventional wisdom.
Goldberg and Dershowitz, Declartng the Death Penalty Unconstiuthonal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773,
1782 (1970).
29. For example, the Court in Gregg stated that "... public perceptions of standards of
decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord
with 'the dignity of man' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.'"
428 U.S. at 173, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
Similarly, in Coker, Justice White explained that, "These recent events evidencing the atti-
tudes of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this controversy, for
the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on
the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment," 433
U.S. at 597.
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the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Extreme reli-
ance on so-called "objective indicia," coupled with a strong presump-
tion that the legislative decisions are constitutional, belies the Court's
claim of independence, however.
The decision-making tools used by Justices applying historical and
contemporary-opinion approaches to the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause are often similar to the tools used by the Justices, discussed
in Part IV below, who attempt to forge their own way through the
moral dilemmas associated with the Eighth Amendment and the capital
punishment issue. History and contemporary political behavior are im-
portant to both modes of analysis. The difference lies in the weight ac-
corded to external, empirical evidence. The approaches discussed here
emphasize depersonalized evidence alone. The alternative approaches
discussed below forthrightly accept the judging process as human and
seek to integrate empirical research with intuition and reflection.
The appeal of the public opinion approach is essentially the same as
the appeal of the historical approach. The Court maintains an imper-
sonal, detached stance, enabling it to fend off any criticism that it is
personalizing the Constitution. The sources of decision are reasonably
concrete facts that are likely to lead to a definite answer. Here again,
this mode of analysis avoids conflict with the majoritarian branches of
government.
Such conflict avoidance is a central concern. Its cardinal principle is
that "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices. '30 By directly defin-
ing the constitutional concept of cruelty in terms of popular opinion the
Court makes legislative decisions the best evidence of the Eighth
Amendment's meaning. It then adopts the legislative judgments
wholesale.
In Gregg, when faced with such overwhelming legislative support of
the death penalty for murder, the Court was simply unwilling to probe
into either the legitimacy of legislative ends (is vengeance permissible
under the Eighth Amendment?) or the fit between means and ends
(does capital punishment really deter more than life imprisonment?).
Legislative authorization answered all of the questions. Justice White's
concurring opinion in Gregg actually argued that widespread legislative
approval of the death penalty proves: (1) the people do not think capi-
tal punishment is morally abhorent, (2) the people think capital punish-
ment is an effective deterrent, and (3) the popular demand for
retribution cannot be satisfied by any lesser punishment.
30. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added).
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Only in Coker, where Georgia stood alone in authorizing capital pun-
ishment for rape, was the Court willing to invalidate the legislative judg-
ment. This implies that the difference in result lies in the variance in
political risk. The Court in Coker did not perceive the political cost of
crossing a single state legislature to be as high as the costs of confronting
a majority of state legislatures and Congress in Gregg. The Coker deci-
sion can be seen more as a triumph of national uniformity than as an
example of judicial bravery in enforcing constitutional rights.
The opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist most dra-
matically illustrate Supreme Court rejection of judicial subjectivity. In-
deed, Burger and Rehnquist appear to believe that judicial objectivity
in interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments clause does not exist
at all. They defer to the legislature in every case. For them, only strong
evidence of "legislative default" 31 would trigger a more active judicial
posture. Burger and Rehnquist principally differ from the Coker major-
ity in their views toward national uniformity. Their strong adherence to
the notion that each state is unique leads to the finding that a rejection
of any particular punishment by most states does bear on the appropri-
ateness of that same punishment in even a single state. 32 The articu-
lated rationale is one of federalism. The effect of the Burger/Rehnquist
approach is to deny the existence of any relevant evidence as to the ac-
ceptability of a particular punishment, other than the legislative act au-
thorizing it.
II. Procedural Approaches
During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court continually has been
grappling with issues involving the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment. In many of these cases, some or all of the Justices have refused to
consider the claim that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punish-
ment per se. Like the Justices employing the empirical approaches dis-
31. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 283, 384 (1972) (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
32. Daniel Polsby argues, similarly:
So long as the crucial matter of fact is taken to be what "society" thinks or does, I can
think of no reason, a priori, why the relevant society to look to ought not to be the people
of each separate state. If the people of Minnesota abhor the death penalty, ... , and
find it unnecessary, then let them abolish it. As a matter of fact, they did, some fifty
years ago. But why, for purposes of establishing constitutional norms, the feelings of the
"society" for citizens of Minnesota ought to control what is cruel and unusual punish-
ment in South Carolina does not seem to be obvious. [E]ven if it is established that
Arkansas, for example, hangs only its Negro murderers and rapists, that fact would logi-
cally furnish no Eighth Amendment justification for why Montana could not hang its
white murderers and rapists.
Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment. Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1,
28-29.
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cussed above, they refuse to assume responsibility for defining the
substance of "cruelty." Unlike the empiricists, however, they do not
readily accept external definitions. They have not simply legitimated
the death penalty. Instead they have focused on procedures employed
by the statutes in question to select those defendants who will be exe-
cuted, and have taken an active role in prescribing acceptable proce-
dures. These cases can be seen as attempts by the Court to avoid
imposing its own substantive decision as to the cruelty of capital punish-
ment while demanding that the substantive moral decisions be brought
into the open. This forces other decision-making centers to confront the
difficult moral issues and to make rational choices in public forums.
Also, the cases may be viewed as attempts to create a procedural screen
to blunt public criticism of the Court's substantive decisions.
A. The Due Process Clause
The first of the capital punishment procedure cases arose under the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause rather than under the cruel
and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Wither-
spoon v. Illinois , '3 the Court held that the automatic exclusion of persons
with conscientious scruples against the death penalty from sentencing
juries in capital cases violated the requirements of due process. Since
the jury is supposed to represent the conscience of the community, and it
is the body which possesses the delegated authority to determine when
to apply the ultimate sanction, all shades of public opinion must be able
to have a voice in that decision-making forum. Laurence Tribe has ex-
plained the Witherspoon decision by suggesting that the acceptability of
capital punishment is a question on which society has not yet reached a
consensus. As a result the Court's role is not to resolve the conflict itself
but to facilitate its resolution by assuring continued open discussion in
other forums. 34 Less sympathetic critics and the Witherspoon dissenters
argued that the majority was motivated by substantive dislike of the
death penalty and sought to use procedural excuses to discourage its
use.
35
In McGautha v. Californ'a,36 the Court was faced with a frontal chal-
33. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
34. Tribe, Siructural Due Arocess, 10 HARV. C.R.C. L. REV. 269, 295-96, 301-02 (1975).
35. Justice White commented, in dissent, "If the Court can offer no better constitutional
grounds than those provided in the opinion, it should restrain its dislike for the death penalty
and leave the decision to the other branches of government." 391 U.S. at 542. Justice Black
protested similarly that "if this Court is to hold capital punishment unconstitutional, . . . it
should do so forthrightly .. " 391 U.S. at 532. See also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, 70-71 (1970).
36. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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lenge to the common system of delegating complete authority to a jury,
unguided by legislatively promulgated standards, in decisions regarding
the imposition of the death penalty in any capital case. The petitioners
aruged that it was a violation of due process for the state legislatures to
commit classification decisions to a transient body, acting secretly, with-
out standards and without review, where it had been determined that
some and perhaps most persons convicted of capital offenses should not
be put to death.
Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, rejected this contention.
He reasoned instead that it is impossible to specify in advance which
homicides justify capital punishment, that any legislative attempt to
promulgate standards for jury discretion could produce only meaning-
less generalities. Thus, a system which trusts the jury, as the conscience
of the community, to maintain a link between the administration of the
criminal law and the evolving morals of society does not violate any
constitutional guarantee. Justice Brennan argued vehemently in
dissent:
We are not presented with a legislative attempt to draw wisdom from ex-
perience through a process looking toward growth in understanding
through the accumulation of a variety of experiences. We are not
presented with the slightest attempt to bring the power of reason to bear
on the considerations relevant to capital sentencing. We are faced with
nothing more than stark legislative abdication. Not once in the history of
this Court, until today, have we sustained against a due process challenge
such an unguided, unbridled, unreviewable exercise of naked power. Al-
most a century ago, we found an almost identical California procedure
constitutionally inadequate to license a laundry. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 366-367, 369-370 (1886). Today we hold it adequate to license a
life.37
B. The Eighth Amendment
(a) Furman.- Unfettered Jury Discretion
Interestingly, McGautha did not end the dispute over the constitution-
ality of unfettered jury discretion in capital cases. Rather than continu-
ing under the due process clause, the procedural debate became
embedded in the Eighth Amendment. In the term immediately follow-
ing McGautha, the Court was presented with another attack on the death
penalty in Furman v. Georgia.38 Although the grant of certiorari in Furman
was limited to Eighth Amendment questions, 39 three Justices' opinions
37. Id. at 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
39. Certiorari in McGautha had been limited to issues of due process.
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focused entirely on procedure, refusing to reach the broader issue of
whether capital punishment could ever be inflicted under any procedure
without violating the Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unu-
sual punishments.
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion 40 argued that there is an im-
plicit principle of equal protection at the core of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Citing Yi'k Wo v. Hopkins,4' Douglas wished to strike down the
statutes allowing the imposition of a death sentence at the hands of a
totally unguided jury because that system is "pregnant with discrimina-
tion."'4 2 Douglas acknowledged that none of the petitioners had proven
that he had been sentenced to die because he was black or because he
was poor. Nevertheless he was willing to invalidate the challenged stat-
ues for three reasons: they allowed room for decision based on race and
class prejudices, the petitioners had compiled statistical evidence show-
ing that the burden of the death penalty did fall far more heavily on the
black and the poor, and the challenged system did not attempt to inter-
pose any safeguards against discriminatory application.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion4 3 argued that the unguided dis-
cretion statues had operated to impose the death penalty so infrequently
that a death sentence had become "freakish. ' 44 Comparison of those
defendants sentenced to die with those given mercy revealed no basis for
differentiating the two groups. Consequently, Stewart concluded that
the system must be operating arbitrarily and unconstitutionally. And in
a concurring opinion similar to Justice Stewart's, Justice White argued
that executions had become so rare that they could not possibily either
deter future crime or exact retribution for particularly heinous crimes
already committed.
45
Despite their focus on procedure, Justices Douglas, Stewart and
White all pegged their concurring opinions on the cruel and unusual
punishments clause. The reason for this is quite mysterious, as is the
reason for the Court's progression from McGautha to Furman. Justice
Douglas stated in Furman that, "We are. . . imprisoned in the McGautha
holding. '4 6 The result in Furman, however, belies that claim. Justices
Stewart and White reversed their votes from McGautha to Furman with-
out explanation. No one explained why a procedure not in violation of
40. 408 U.S. at 240.
41. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
42. 408 U.S. at 257.
43. 408 U.S. at 306.
44. Id. at 310.
45. Id. Both White and Stewart rejected the contention that the miniscule number of
death sentences represented a refinement of the selection process rather than arbitrariness of
discrimination.
46. 408 U.S. at 248.
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the due process clause (the constitutional provision most relevant to
claims of arbitrariness in the administration of the judicial system) did
violate the cruel and unusual punishments clause. Perhaps the explana-
tion is that rather than being imprisoned in their previous holding in
McGautha, the Court was imprisoned in its limited grant of certiorari. Or,
perhaps the Court was loath to admit that two of its members had sim-
ply changed their minds. In any event, Furman injected a requirement
of heightened procedural regularity into the Eighth Amendment, at
least as applied to death penalty cases, and post-Furman procedural chal-
lenges have remained rooted in the Eighth Amendment.
(b) Gregg.: RestrictedJury Discretion
The next great wave of death penalty cases came four years later in
Gregg v. Georgia and its companions. 47 This family of cases raised chal-
lenges to two types of capital punishment statues enacted in response to
the Court's opinins in Furman. Some sought to restrict jury discretion by
prescribing specific factors to be considered by the sentencing jury. The
others imposed a mandatory death sentence on anyone convicted of spe-
cific categories of offenses. Challenges to these statutes resulted in the
Court's rejection of the petitioners' claim that the death penalty is in all
cases repugnant to the cruel and unusual punishments clause, regardless
of the procedures used for selecting the individuals to be executed. The
plurality again focused on procedure and upheld the guided discretion
statutes. 48 It struck down the mandatory capital punishment statutes.
49
The proceduralist plurality, consisting of Justices Stewart, Powell and
Stevens, reasoned that the Georgia, Florida, and Texas statues suffi-
ciently curtailed the jury's authority to avoid the vices of Furman. Those
statues either specified aggravating and mitigating factors for the jury to
weigh in reaching its conclusion -0 or asked the jury a series of questions
which arguably would have the same effect.5 ' All provided for appellate
review of the sentencing decisions.
The same three Justices held the North Carolina and Louisiana stat-
utes invalid, however, based on three grounds. First, they argued that
the mandatory statutes failed to reflect prevailing moral standards in
American society because the history of capital punishment in the
United States revealed a general election restriction in the use of the
47. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.'
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
48. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Profftt, 428 U.S. 292; andJurek, 428 U.S. 262.
49. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 and Roberts, 428 U.S. 325.
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(5) and (6)
(Supp. 1976-1977).
51. TEx CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN., art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976).
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death penalty - a progressive rejection of mandatory death penalty
schemes together with a progressive restriction in the number of capital
crimes. Second, they argued that because mandatory death sentences
,are unacceptable to the American people, the statutes, even if facially
neutral, would not be so applied. Jury nullification and prosecutorial
discretion would be used to mitigate the harshness of the statutes, and
these mechanisms would maintain the same arbitrary pattern of execu-
tion found so appalling in Furman. Third, the plurality argued that a
mandatory statute must fail because it "treats all persons convicted of a
designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind
infliction of the penalty of death.
' '52
Considering the overall result of the proceduralist series of death pen-
alty decisions - sentencing by totally unfettered juries is unconstitu-
tional; mandatory infliction of death upon conviction of a capital
offense is unconstitutional; and sentencing by a jury guided by legisla-
tively promulgated standards is constitutional - it is possible to see
these cases as a continuation of Wiherspoon as explained by Tribe.
53
The proceduralist opinions can be seen as attempts to force the maxi-
mum amount of public debate, involving the widest spectrum of opin-
ion, dispersed among the maximum number of decision-makers, as to
the continued acceptability of capital punishment. The Justices espous-
ing these views are unwilling to examine for themselves the competing
moral claims in this dispute. Given the importance of life, the irrevoca-
bility of the death penalty and the near inevitability of mistake in its
application, however, they are willing to demand that other decision-
making bodies think very carefully and articulate clearly the basis for
their conclusions before condemning anyone to death.
Viewed from this perspective, the unguided jury discretion system
must fail, since it permits executions without any institutional level ar-
ticulation of the reasons for choosing life or death. Decisions may be
based on constitutionally impermissible factors such as race or class, but
there is no way of finding that out. Moreover, juries may not articulate,
even to themselves, the basis for their decisions. They are transient bod-
ies, composed of individuals who do not have to account to anyone for
their choices. Under such a system, persons may conceivably be exe-
cuted without much thought.
Statutes prescribing the automatic imposition of a death sentence on
everyone convicted of certain precisely defined categories of offenses rep-
resent the legislative battle with the issue of who should live and who
52. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
53. See iwfta note 34.
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should die. Once the legislature has acted, however, the contemplative
process stops. Jurors have no input. Circumstances unforeseen by the
legislature or individual characteristics of particular defendants can be
taken into account only through the mechanism of jury nullification.
Mandatory capital punishment schemes may be seen as unacceptable
both because they cut off debate prematurely and because they allow
the legislature to condemn a person to death from a distance. Abstract
condemnation may be seen as illegitimate because it is unknowing. It
may be seen as illegitimate for the State to impose such an awesome
penalty without some official's personal involvement and hence implicit
moral responsibility for a forced forfeiture of life.
The statutes attempting to provide sentencing juries with guidelines
within which to exercise their discretion may be approved because they
spread the decision-making process over time and between decision-
makers, with the inherent procedural opportunities for mercy. In Geor-
gia, for example, the state legislature first debated the issue and specified
the aggravating factors creating the potential for capital punishment in
each case. Now, with these factors in mind, each sentencing jury consid-
ers the same moral dilemma of the propriety of official murder, in the
context of a particular defendant's personal history and criminal behav-
ior. Finally, an appellate tribunal reviews the record for evidence of
racial or other prejudice, and for consistency with other Georgia deci-
sions imposing the death penalty. The appellate court must file a writ-
ten opinion, citing cases it relied on to conclude that the death sentence
in that case is consistent with Georgia practice in prosecutions for simi-
lar crimes.
Judicial legitimation of such a scheme may be regarded as an attempt
to force the difficult moral dilemma out into the open in as many fo-
rums as possible. Increased public debate may then lead to a "rational"
capital punishment system which selects the worst offenders for execu-
tion, to the democratic rejection of capital punishment, to more relevant
evidence on which the Court could later base its own rejection of capital
punishment, or to convincing arguments that capital punishment is not
unacceptably cruel.
A closer comparison of the capital sentencing systems upheld against
those struck down reveals distinctions more formal than real. The in-
quiry has been limited almost exclusively to jury discretion, although
other discretionary areas in the criminal justice system present similar
opportunities for discrimination. The proceduralist demand that sen-
tencing systems provide both equal and individual treatment of persons
convicted of capital crimes introduces an irresolvable tension into the
Eighth Amendment procedural requirements. Consequently, an idealis-
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tic attempt to make sense of these cases based on their results alone is
simply untenable.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Woodson v. North Carolina54 convincingly
argues that the rationales advanced by the plurality in holding the
mandatory capital punishment statutes unconstitutional do not suffice.
It is not clear if the mandatory capital punishment schemes are more
subject to risks of arbitrary or discriminatory application than are the
guided discretion schemes. The risk of arbitrariness enters the process
through each available avenue of discretion. The points of risk are dif-
ferent in the guided discretion procedures. They are not eliminated.
Under a mandatory capital punishment system, the prosecutor's deci-
sion whether to charge the capital offense, his or her decision whether or
not to accept a guilty plea to a lesser offense, and the jury's decision on
guilt or innocence are the major points where prejudice may enter the
decision-making process. Under the Georgia system, upheld in Gregg, no
jury may impose a death sentence in the absence of a unanimous find-
ing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one of the enumerated aggravating
factors was present. The jury is free to consider any mitigating factors it
deems relevant and may decline to impose the death penalty at any
time, whether its reason is rational or irrational, or whether it is moti-
vated by feelings of mercy toward a defendant or by racial prejudice
against an unpopular victim. In addition, the prosecutor has the same
charging and bargaining powers in guided-discretion jurisdictions as in
mandatory jurisdictions. It is not clear why prosecutors in jurisdictions
leaving some discretion to the jury will exercise their charg-
ing/bargaining powers with more self-restraint than prosecutors in
mandatory death penalty jurisdictions. Similarly, there is no reason
that juries in statutorily guided-discretion jurisdictions will act less arbi-
trarily than mandatory jurisdiction juries. The former jury exercises its
discretion within the constraints of the specified guidelines. The latter
exercises the same discretionary power by choosing between the
"mandatory" capital conviction and lesser included offences not neces-
sarily supported by the evidence.
In fact, a comparison of the statutes sustained with those invalidated
in the Gregg family, reveals that none of the five imposes any serious
limits on the capital sentencing process. The Georgia statute upheld in
Gregg lists ten aggravating factors justifying a death sentence,
55
54. 428 U.S. at 311-312 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (b) (Supp. 1975) lists the following aggravating circum-
stances: (1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery or kidnapping was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense or
murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious
assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery or kidnapping was committed while the
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including:
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery or kidnapping was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved tor-
ture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
This so-called standard is so vague as to authorize capital punishment in
almost any case, and is exactly the same system that the Court struck
down four years earlier in Furman.
The Florida statute sustained in Proffitt is similar to the Georgia stat-
ute,5 6 and includes at least one clause which could authorize death on a
offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated bat-
tery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery or kidnapping knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another for the purpose of
receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or
former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an
agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery or kidnapping was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee
or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing
a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (5) (Supp. 1976-1977) lists the following aggravating
circumstances:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony, or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death of many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after commit-
ting or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose or avoiding or preventing a law-
ful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gains.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was espcially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (6) (Supp. 1977) lists the following mitigating circumstances:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another per-
son and his participation was relative minor.
Yale Law & Policy Review
whim:
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Unlike the Georgia statute, the Florida statute provides that the jury
recommend whether or not to impose the death penalty by majority
vote, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. The actual
sentence is then chosen by the judge, who is free to reject the jury's rec-
ommendation if "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."
5 7 Of
course, in this case at least seven jurors, supposedly representative of the
community, do differ.
The Texas statute upheld inJurek allows the jury to impose the death
penalty where a defendant is convicted of "capital murder," a subspe-
cies of murder characterized by any of five aggravating additional cir-
cumstances. 5 At the sentencing hearing, the court may admit all
evidence it deems relevant to sentencing. It then submits the following
three questions to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expec-
tation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crim-
inal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to soci-
ety; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonble in response to the provocation, if
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person.
() The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of this conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
57. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975) (This is the authoritative construction of
the statute by the Florida Supreme Court.)
58. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN., Art. 1257 (Vernon Supp. 1973) (supersededby TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974)) provided:
(b) The punishment for murder with malice aforethought shall be death or imprison-
ment for life if:
(1) The person murdered a peace officer or fireman who was acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty and who the defendant knew was a peace officer
or fireman;
(2) The person intentionally committed the murder in the course of committing
or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or
arson;
(3) The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remu-
neration or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration;
(4) The person committed the murder while escaping or attempting to escape
from a penal institution;
(5) The person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murdered another who
was employed in the operation of the penal institution.
Vol. 1:41, 1982
Perspectives on the Death Penalty
any, by the deceased. 59
It is hard to imagine how a jury could answer "no" to question (1) hav-
ing already found the defendant to have "intentionally or knowingly"
caused the death.60 Similarly, it is difficult to understand how a jury
could answer "no" to question (3) having already declined to find the
provocation that would make the defendant guilty of manslaughter
rather than murder. That leaves question (2); it is not clear how a jury
of laypersons can answer this question at all given the present develop-
ment of the science of behavior prediction. Question (2) asks the jury to
determine whether there is a probability, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant will commit violent acts in the future. 6' Even if behavior
were predictable, the question arguably is meaningless, for it contains
two conflicting standards of certainty. The statute does not specify what
probability of future violence is required to send a defendant to his or
her death, but it does tell the jury to be certain beyond a reasonable
doubt that that probability exists. In addition, there is no explanation
of why the jury is to be provided with all evidence that the judge deems
relevant to sentencing if it is only used to guess about future behavior.
If, as is suggested by the plurality opinion injurek, question (2) is to be
the vehicle for the sentencing jury's consideration of mitigating circum-
stances, the question posed gives no hint of that function to the jury.
The Texas statute places mitigating evidence before the jury, asks three
irrelevant questions and assumes that if the jury is sufficiently moved it
will answer "no" to one of them. Such a scheme is worse than one that
provides no guidance for decision-making. It leads the jury in the wrong
direction. It refuses to allow the jury the power to grant mercy (as the
Georgia and Florida statutes do), thus forcing it to either reverse its pre-
vious decision on intent or provocation, or to predict future non-
dangerousness.
The North Carolina statute held unconstitutional in Woodson imposed
the death penalty on every defendant convicted of "willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing" or of killing in the course of perpetrating any
felony. 62 The statute mandates the execution of every robber who acci-
59. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-76).
60. TEXAS CODE OF CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071 also provides:
(c) The State must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury
shall return a special verdict of "yes" or "no" on each issue submitted.
(d) The Court shall charge the jury that:
(1) it may not answer any issue "yes unless it agrees unanimously; and
(2) it may not answer any issue "no" unless 10 or more jurors agree.
61. Id.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975):
Murder in the fist and second degree defined; punishment. - A murder which shall be perpe-
trated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other
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dentally kills his or her victim and of every killer deemed to have acted
willfully. The Louisiana statute invalidated in Roberts ordered capital
punishment for everyone convicted of first degree murder-a crime re-
quiring "a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" coupled
with one of five additional elements, including killing while "engaged in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated rape or armed robbery. ' 63 Second degree murder is defined
as killing with "a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" or
killing while "engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggra-
vated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery.
'64
The Louisiana and North Carolina statutes require death for those
convicted of the capital offense. Neither statute mandates charging the
capital offense nor prohibits plea bargaining in capital cases. Thus, the
discretion to differentiate among defendants lies with the prosecutor.
Some defendants will risk their lives while others will risk only imprison-
ment, although their acts both may fall within the definition of the capi-
tal crime. The prosecutor's choice is virtually unreviewable. It is also
important to note that under both the North Carolina and Louisiana
statutes, life or death hinges in large part on the jury's possibly errone-
ous decision. If it is difficult or impossible for a jury to determine with
certainty what another person intended at some point in the past, as
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or
other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with
death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall
be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor more than life
imprisonment in the State's prison.
This statute was enacted after the North Carolina Supreme Court declared that the
provision of the previous statute allowing the jury to recommend mercy was unconstitu-
tional under the rule of Furman v. Georgia, and held that statute, construed so as to elimi-
nate the offending provision, was constitutional. State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194
S.E. 2d 19 (1973). Following Waddell, the legislature enacted the wholly mandatory
statute.
63. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (1974) provided:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict attempted perpetration of
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a
fireman or a peace officer who is engaged in the performance of his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and
has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence;
or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon
more than one person; or
(5) When the offender has a specific intent to commit murder and has been offered or
has received anything of value for committing the murder.
64. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.30.1 (1974).
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required by the Louisiana statute, a jury determination of whether the
killing was premeditated, as required by the North Carolina statute,
poses an even greater problem. As a legal scholar has stated:
If "meditation" connotes some duration of thought, then "premeditation"
might be expected to denote thought about the killing over a considerable
time. But judges have repeatedly said that the premeditation need not be
of any particular length; a moment is enough. On the other hand, "pre-
meditation" is not the same as "intent to kill." . . . In sum, in a great
many close cases, no matter how patiently the judge tries to explain to the
jury that which he himself only cloudily understands, the net result must
be that twelve laypersons have no alternative to using their general sense of
the equities of the matter. But this means that these purported rules, at
the crucial line of separation between those who are to die and those who
are to live, conceal a discretion which, however benevolent, is to all intents
and purposes standardless.
65
In essence, the guided jury discretion schemes held to be constitu-
tional do nothing to remedy the problem addressed by Furman. The
mandatory capital punishment systems held to be unconstitutional do
address the narrow jury discretion problem by curtailing the jury's au-
thority to grant mercy. None of the post-Furman statutes make any at-
tempt to limit prosecutorial discretion leading to the imposition of
capital punishment, none limit the use of the pardoning power, and
none make any clearer the abstract psychological questions separating
guilt from innocence in the definition of capital offenses. Capital sen-
tencing post-Gregg is basically the same as capital sentencing pre-Furman.
The proceduralist plurality opinions in Gregg and its companions can
be seen as attempts to avoid the Court's holding in Furman without em-
bracing a substantive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. If the
true vice of the capital punishment systems outlawed in Furman was leg-
islative abdication of responsibility leading to capriciousness in the exer-
cise of jury discretion, then the logical remedy is to eliminate jury
discretion. This goal may be attained either by forcing the legislature to
specify precisely which criminals are to be executed or by eliminating
65. Charles L. BlackJr., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 48-50 (1974). Black argues similarly with respect to sanity determinations in capi-
tal cases:
Once again, let us remember that we have committed ourselves not to kill by law, or
even to punish, anyone who satisfies certain criteria as to the connection of "insanity"
with this commission of the act. Yet the astounding fact is that having made this com-
mitment, for what must be the most imperative moral reasons, we cannot state these
criteria in any understandable form, in any form satisfying to the relevant specialists or
comprehensible to either judge or jury, despite repeated and earnest trials.
Id. at 52-53 When these inadequate criteria result in a mistaken determination of sanity
in a noncapital case, a sane person goes to a mental hospital or an insane person goes to
jail. In a capital case, mistake results in a wrongful death.
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the death penalty entirely. The problem with this logic is that selection
of the former solution leads to the conclusion that the execution of large
numbers of carefully classified persons does not offend the cruel and un-
usual punishments clause, although the random execution of a few per-
sons does. Such a result would be ridiculous. If the Eighth Amendment
means anything at all, it must be the constitutional embodiment of the
principles of mercy, dignity, and humane treatment of all persons. It is
plainly absurd to suggest that the constitutional provision prohibiting
cruelty is indifferent to whether government replaces an impermissibly
arbitrary execution system with one taking more lives, fewer lives, or
abandoning completely the taking of lives by official, process. If only to
avoid complete absurdity, the proceduralists had to find a way to reject
the mandatory capital punishment statutes. The method that they
chose for their rejection of mandatory death sentences was the require-
ment of individual treatment in the sentencing process. 66 Unfortu-
nately, this approach is unsatisfactory because the tension between
individual decision-making, and regularized decision-making, which
eliminates arbitrariness and discrimination to the greatest possible ex-
tent, is simply irresolvable. The procedures which remove individuals
from the "faceless, undifferentiated mass" permit those removals to be
made on constitutionally objectionable grounds.
It is not the rejection of mandatory capital punishment statutes on
procedural grounds, but the refusal to reject the plainly unsatisfactory
attempts to rationalize the jury's decision-making process, that makes
the proceduralist opinions in the Gregg family of cases untenable. The
statutes do not provide any concrete standards for the jury. Moreover,
even if they did, there are many other points in the process leading to
execution where decision-makers can exercise their unreviewable discre-
tion. Rationalizing the jury's role would make little difference. The
prosecutor's choice of charge, the prosecutor's willingness to plea bar-
gain, the jury's choice between conviction on the capital offense or a
lesser included offense, and the executive decision to commute the death
sentence all operate to render unpredictable the decision regarding
state-sanctioned killing.
6 7
It is also possible to see Gregg and its companions as multiplying the
procedural hurdles a state must clear before it legitimately may take a
life. This results not in a channeling of democratic problem-solving en-
ergies, but only in a minimization of the number of executions. From
66. See i.fra p. 57.
67. See generaly BLACK, supra note 65; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 23 at 1789-94.
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this viewpoint, the Court does indirectly what it is afraid to do, or be-
lieves itself unempowered to do, directly.
This mode of judicial behavior is wrong both as a matter of theoreti-
cal legitimacy and as a matter of practical efficacy. Both the legitimacy
of the Court's edicts and their persuasive power turn on the reasoning
set forth in published opinions. Publishing opinions that evade the basis
for the result or play "hide-the-ball" do not fulfill the judicial function.
Such opinions do not sufficiently indicate why a democratically enacted
statute is invalid. They discourage further public debate of the true is-
sues. Instead they seek to deflect public discussion to other topics - in
this case from the substantive constitutionality of the death penalty to
alternative procedures for its infliction. The Court eases away from a
deeply discomforting subject to one with which it is more familiar and
more willing to claim expertise. If the lie is unsuccessful, the Court is
caught in its own evasive web with a resulting weakening of public be-
lief in its adjudicative abilities. If the lie is successful, the Court has
truly usurped power: It commands a substantive result while hiding
from the real debate on the propriety of its position.
In more practical terms, the Court's failure to articulate substantive
reasons for rejecting the death penalty only makes its abolition more
difficult. By resting its decisions on procedural grounds, the Court legit-
imates the penalty itself. Both the Furman and Gregg decisions leave to
other governmental institutions the freedom to discard capital punish-
ment. To an extent the Court's multiplication of procedure encourages
them to do so. Opinions focusing on procedural inadequacies encourage
legislatures to invent new procedures, but not to reexamine the funda-
mental moral questions raised by capital punishment, or the relation-
ship between the death penalty and the ends sought to be served by the
criminal justice system.
In the case of capital punishment, it is possible that proceduralism
could have provided an acceptable means of Eighth Amendment analy-
sis, had the Court been willing to carry the argument to its logical con-
clusion and mandate abolition of the death penalty. It would be
plausible to argue that the tension between eliminating all possible
sources of prejudice in the system and retaining the individual decision-
making required to do justice in unforeseen circumstances cannot be
resolved, that in any case it is impossible to eliminate prejudice entirely,
that mistakes are inevitable, and that consequently our judicial process
is just too feeble to be trusted with the responsibility of choosing people
to die.
68
68. To say that the judicial process cannot be trusted to select individuals for execution is
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Justice Brennan, dissenting in McGautha, would take this position only
after attempts to devise constitutionally acceptable procedures had
failed.69 Justice Douglas, concurring in Furman, hints at this conclu-
sion.70 Daniel Polsby ridicules Douglas's position, however, arguing
that this approach:
boils down to one of two propositions: (1) The poverty of these defendants
prevented them from getting adequate lawyers-which is in this instance
plainly incorrect. (2) The low social status of defendants prejudiced the
jury against them, a bias which is (a) invidious if all possible steps were not
taken to prevent bias, or (b) inevitable if no conceivable steps could have
ameliorated the bias. If 2(a) is accepted, then what is wanted is a new
trial. If 2(b) is accepted-and unconstitutionality is nonetheless found-




I would argue that if 2(b) is accepted and a new world is not among
the available alternatives, then the only option is to conclude that in this
imperfect world, capital punishment cannot be tolerated. 72  The
proceduralists have not taken this position. They have attempted to dis-
tinguish between procedures, and those attempts have failed.
III. Substantive Independent Judicial Consideration of Eighth
Amendment Claims
The alternative to a judicial search for empirical certainty or a retreat
into procedure is for judges, in capital cases, to make their own in-
dependent, substantive decisions defining the constitutional concept of
cruelty. Such judgments are not tied to either historical practice or con-
temporary public opinion, although they may draw on those sources to
support conclusions reached independently. Judges operating in this
mode view themselves as guardians of important constitutional values,
such as liberty, equality, human dignity, and mercy. Consequently,
not necessarily to say that it cannot be trusted to make any decisions at all, or that it cannot
be trusted to inflict lesser punishments. Capital punishment may be singled out because of
the unique agony of the extinction of life and because of its irrevocability. Time spent in
prison cannot be given back. But a person wrongfully convicted can be released, and some
monetary compensation can be given. A prison sentence can be shortened if the prisoner
exhibits good behavior while incarcerated or if in more sober judgment the original sentence
appears too harsh. Nothing can give back a life. See BLACK, supra note 65, at 40-41.
69. 402 U.S. at 248.
70. 408 U.S. at 240.
71. Polsby, supra note 32, at 13.
72. See Radin, supra note 20, at 1016-1030 arguing that capital punishment should be
prohibited by a moral risk of error principle. Radin reasons that, although accepted moral
principles do not reveal a consensus either in favor of abolishing or of retaining the death
penalty, the harmonizing of moral principles about which there is a consensus requires a
reduction of the risk of error in applying the death penalty.
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they are unwilling to defer to other decision-makers' substantive choices
as a matter of course. They are not afraid to use their intuition as a
decision-making tool, or to announce a conclusion which is less than
mathematically certain. They then support their conclusions with argu-
ments drawn from history, social science data, moral philosophy, and
textual analysis.
Substantive analysis under the cruel and unusual punishments clause
has taken two basic forms. One is based on a concept of proportionality
said to underlie the Eighth Amendment. Punishments that are exces-
sively harsh in relation to the crime for which they are imposed are un-
constitutional under this standard. Both the crime and the penalty are
subject to judicial analysis. The relationship between them is the cen-
tral subject of inquiry. Other cases brought under the Eighth Amend-
ment consider certain punishments categorically, rejecting those that are
too cruel and degrading to human dignity to be inflicted in response to
any crime, regardless of how horrible. This type of analysis focuses on
the governmental behavior alone. The triggering criminal act is
irrelevant.
73
If one were motivated to articulate a single fundamental principle
underlying the cruel and unusual punishments clause, a possible candi-
date is a ban on "excessive" rather than "disproportionate" punish-
ments.7 4 In its utilitarian form, the excessiveness test transcends the
73. It could be argued that to reject a penalty, such as the death sentence, absolutely is to
say that it is disproportionate to any and all crimes, thereby collapsing the two types of
Eighth Amendment inquire into one, rooted in the proportionality principle. There is a dif-
ference, however, even if only in emphasis, between saying that a particular crime does not
warrant the punishment imposed, and saying that the punishment is so brutal that the Con-
stitution cannot ever countenance its application. I believe that to collapse one into the other
adds nothing to the discussion. The articulation of an absolute ban of categories of punish-
ments in terms of excessiveness or disproportionality may obscure the reason for the ban. To
say that a penalty is unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to one crime is to imply
that some crime exists to which it is not disproportionate. If the very nature of some penalties
mandates their rejection under the Eighth Amendment, then it only confuses the discussion to
talk about proportionality, which requires analysis of both the crime and the penalty. This
consideration implicates the dignity principle described by Justice Brennan with reference to
classic tortures:
The true significance of these punishments is that they treat members of the human race
as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent
with the fundamental premise of the [cruel and unusual punishments] clause that even
the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity. Furman,
408 U.S. at 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. In Coker, Justice White announced a two part test for determining whether a punish-
ment is excessive (and thus unconstitutional). The Georgia statute failed under the second
half, a disproportionality criterion. The first prong of the Coker test, which was not applied
there, or in any other case, embodies a utilitarian rather than a retributive notion of excessive-
ness. Under that test the Court must judge the fit between the punishment imposed and the
ends sought to be served by its imposition, rather than the fit between the punishment and
the crime. In the end, if the test is to be effective, it must lead to some type of least restrictive
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categorization of the Eighth Amendment cases suggested above. Under
this excessiveness test the judicial process becomes a means/ends analy-
sis, which can be applied not only where the challenged punishment is
alleged to be too great for a particular crime but also where the chal-
lenged punishment is alleged to be too brutal to be inflicted in any case.
Even if a utilitarian concept of excessiveness could be applied to all of
the Eighth Amendment cases, that approach has seldom been used by
the Court. 75 In part this may be due to the difficulty of applying a least
restrictive means analysis to challenged criminal sanctions. First, such
an analysis would demand resolution of the continuing confusion over
the often conflicting purposes to be served by criminal sanctions. 76 Sec-
ond, such an analysis is dependent on determinations of how much and
what kind of punishment is enough to serve the purposes accepted as
legitimate - determinations which for the most part are infeasible at
the present time. The utilitarian excessiveness principle fails as an over-
arching principle. But, it does serve as a complement to the dignity
principle. This principle helps explain why punishments which are ex-
cessive in a utilitarian sense should be forbidden. An excessive punish-
ment is not merely a waste of societal resources but an unwarranted
imposition of suffering. It is an affront to the dignity of the person in-
flicting the punishment as well as the dignity of the victim. 77 The exces-
siveness principle complements the dignity principle by suggesting a
methodology - means/ends analysis - for identifying violations of the
value embodied in the dignity principle.
In contrast, the proportionality principle seeks to impose a punish-
means analysis, for any penalty is needless if a less restrictive alternative could serve the legiti-
mate ends just as well.
75. But see Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman at 342, arguing that capital
punishment is not more effective than life imprisonment in meeting the legitimate goals of
punishment; see also infra pp. 78-79.
76. The commonly articulated purposes of criminal punishment include deterrence of
crime by persons other than the offender, deterrence of the particular offender from addi-
tional criminal acts, isolation of the offender from the community so that he or she cannot
commit any crimes during that time, and rehabilitation of the offender and retribution
against the offender. The potential conflicts between these goals are obvious. For example,
the punishment that one would choose if rehabilitation were the primary goal of the criminal
justice system would almost certainly fail to satisfy those members of the community who
desire retribution, and might not be harsh enough to deter many potential criminals. A pun-
ishment that simply removes convicted persons from society does nothing to rehabilitate
them. A retributive punishment, tailored to the community outrage at crime would not con-
tribute to rehabilitation, and even might embitter those punished so that rather than being
deterred from future crime, they would be more likely to commit crimes when released. Of
course, it is also possible that some punishments may serve multiple goals. But, it is highly
unlikely that any one punishment could serve all of the above-mentioned goals.
77. We are concerned about excessive punishments because we identify convicted persons
as members of the human community who are entitled, despite their transgressions, to be
treated with at least a modicum of dignity. See Radin, supra note 20, at 1044.
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ment which the criminal "deserves" in response to his or her criminal
behavior. It acts as a limit on the infliction of punishment where the
criminal behavior does not inflict great harm on a victim or on the com-
munity. The principle rests on a notion of moral blameworthiness. The
utilitarian excessiveness principle could not effect the same limitation
unless some notion of proportionality were included at the point of eval-
uating the acceptability of legislative ends.
Most of the Court's attempts to grapple independently with the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment fall under the rubrics of either the
dignity or the proportionality principles. These two principles represent
separate constituent elements of the constitutional proscription on cruel
and unusual punishments. Therefore, the discussion below will be or-
ganized around these principles, as applied by various Justices of the
Supreme Court.
A. The Proportionality Principle
An important recent application of the proportionality principle78 in
a death penalty case occured in Coker v. Georgia .79 Justice White's major-
ity opinion initially focused on the national consensus against imposing
the death penalty for rape.8 0 The opinion then turned to an independ-
ent examination of the harm caused by the rapist to the rape victim and
to the community, first as measured against the damage done by a mur-
derer, whose life the Court had previously held could be taken in pun-
ishment, and second as compared to the harm done by capital
punishment. White concluded that where the rapist does not take the
victim's life, the government may not constitutionally demand the rap-
ist's life in return.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does
not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of
human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by
definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to an-
other person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does
not. Life is over for the victim of the murder; for the rape victims, life may
not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not
78. The Court had previously articulated the proportionality principle as a component of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause in Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding the
Philippine punishments of cadena temporal - 12 years imprisonment at hard labor plus loss of
civil liberties - disproportionate to the crime of falsifying government records). See also
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing 54 years
imprisonment disproportionate to prohibition offense).
79. 433 U.S. 584 (1977), holding the death penalty disproportionate to the crime of rap-
ing an adult woman, as discussed p. 49.
80. See supra pp. 49, 51-52.
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beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty,
which "is unique in its severity and irrevocability," Gregg v. Georgia, 423
U.S. at 187, is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not
take human life.8 1
The underlying principle here is one of individual criminal responsi-
bility. It limits the infliction of punishment for the legitimate utilitarian
purpose of deterrence through the retributive notion of just desserts.
Each person may be punished only as much as is warranted by his or
her own criminal acts. Greater punishment is forbidden no matter how
effective a deterrent. In Coker, dissenters argued that legislatures should
be free to exact heavy penalties, greater than an eye for an eye,8 2 in
order to control crimes that are particularly prevalent locally, or espe-
cially difficult to detect or deter.8 3 But this argument was rejected in
favor of the retributive limitation.
The proportionality principle can also be seen to embody a notion of
equal treatment - not absolute equality regardless of the crime com-
mitted, but equality in the degree of harshness or mercy with which all
crimes are treated. The proportionality principle requires a rational or-
dering of crimes, the establishment of a parallel gradient of punishment,
and the maintenance of a constant coefficient for translating crime into
punishment. This principle forbids the singeling out of certain offenses
for the imposition of penalties which are so harsh as to be aberrant in
the context of the whole criminal code.
This argument presumes the susceptibility of legislative decisions, or-
dering a criminal code, to judicial review for rationality. If any ordering
of offenses is permissible, there will be no way of determining if a partic-
ular penalty is aberrantly severe, in violation of the proportionality prin-
ciple, or merely appropriate to a crime considered particularly
reprehensible in a certain jurisdiction.
It is in undertaking an independent ordering of crimes that the Court
most imposes its own moral judgments. For example, Justice White, in
Coker,8 4 holds that the Georgia statute allowing the imposition of the
death penalty for some rapes (that is, if one or more statutory aggravat-
ing factors is present) while forbidding its imposition for some inten-
tional murders (that is, if no statutory aggravating factors are present) is
constitutionally impermissible under the proportionality principle. If
this is true, it is because the unique nature of life in our ethical and legal
system makes the intentional extinguishment of life always worse than
81. 433 U.S. at 598.
82. 433 U.S. at 620-21 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
83. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 384 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
84. 433 U.S. at 584.
Vol. 1:41, 1982
Perspectives on the Death Penalty
any offense to the body which does not extinguish a life, regardless of
attendant circumstances. The judicial recognition of the overriding im-
portance of life generates two related conclusions: (1) all purposeful tak-
ings of life must be punished more severely than all other injuries to
person or property; and (2) where the defendant takes less than a life,
the State may not take a life in punishment.
8 5
Throughout the proportionality cases the Court disavows any intent
to become the "ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibil-
ity."'8 6 Yet, at the margins that is exactly what it is doing. Perhaps the
labelling of punishments as "grossly disproportionate"' 7 signifies an in-
tention by members of the Court to impose an independent judgement
of criminal responsibility only in extreme cases, using the proportional-
ity principle as an interpretive guide similar to a rule of reasonability.
B. The Dignity Prznciple
Unlike the proportionality principle, which focuses on the offender's
behavior and ultimately demands rationality and consistency in the or-
dering of a State's criminal code, the dignity principle treats the of-
fender's acts as irrelevant, and has more often been applied in cases
involving capital punishment.8 8
The dignity principle can be derived from a repudiation of physical
torture. This principle prohibits punishments which, like torture, inflict
enormous suffering on their victims, horrify observers, and dehumanize
the persons inflicting the punishment. The problem facing Justices ap-
plying the dignity principle is to develop a methodology more sophisti-
cated than just an intuitive response. There is a need to identify those
punishments that overstep the limits of dignity. The two instances of
violation of the dignity principle that appear most frequently in
Supreme Court opinions are excessiveness, as measured by a
means/ends analysis,8 9 and community rejection of the challenged
85. Similarily, Justice Powell's dissent in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980),
emphasizes the hierarchical importance of life, physical well-being, and material wealth as
subjects of state protection through criminal law. The Texas recidivist statute's imposition of
equal penalties for capital murder and three time theft and its failure to impose harsher
penalties for crimes of physical violence than for non-violent crimes to property transgress
that moral hierarchy. The Rummel dissent also identifies the less specific proportionality re-
quirement of maintaining a gradient of punishments - a value not served by the Texas
statute, which treats all three-time felons alike without regard to the offenses committed.
86. Powell v. Texas, 372 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
87. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592.
88. The dignity principle is also applied in cases involving prison conditions which affect
a whole class of persons convicted of a variety of crimes. See e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
89. See hjira pp. 67-68.
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punishment.
In the opinions discussed below community rejection is not used as an
independent determinant of constitutionality, as it is in the opinions ap-
plying an empirical public opinion approach to Eighth Amendment ad-
judication.90 Instead, it is used as evidence that the punishment is
employed with inhumane motives or inflicts dehumanizing agony on its
victims. Under this approach, a punishment is not unconstitutional be-
cause the people oppose it. That the people oppose it (or would oppose
it if they knew of its effects) indicates that there is something abhorrent
about it which may violate the Eighth Amendment.
In Furman v. Georgia91 Justice Marshall develops the principle prohibit-
ing retribution for its own sake by connecting it with the dignity princi-
ple.92 Justice Marshall, concurring in Furman, put forth a four-pronged
definition of the constitutional concept of cruelty, applying the four ele-
ments in the alternative. 93 First, the Eighth Amendment bans physi-
cally torturous punishments, as intended by the Framers. These
punishments are always unconstitutional, no matter how public opinion
changes. Second, the Eighth Amendment prohibits new and unusual
punishments not invented in the interest of punishing with less pain
than traditional punishments. Third, excessive punishments serving no
valid legislative purposes are prohibited. And fourth, the cruel and un-
usual punishments clause proscribes punishments that have been re-
jected by popular sentiment. Because the death penalty has a long
history of acceptance in the United States, it passes the first two tests.
Justice Marshall would hold it unconstitutional under both the third
and fourth tests.
94
The third prong of Marshall's analysis requires an articulation of the
legitimate goals of punishment and an examination of capital punish-
ment's utility in furthering those goals. Marshall applies a least restric-
tive means standard to the excessiveness test.9 5 The only legitimate
governmental purposes of punishment that Marshall recognizes are iso-
90. See z7fta pp. 44-51.
91. 408 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
92. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the Court struck down a federal statute impos-
ing loss of citizenship as the penalty for desertion during wartime. ChiefJustice Warren held
for the plurality that the penalty of expatriation violated the principle of dignity at the foun-
dation of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Brennan filed a separate concurring opinion hold-
ing expatriation beyond the enumerated powers of Congress and rejecting "naked
vengeance" as a legitimate Congressional goal. In Fumzan, Justice Marshall connected the
separate analyses of Trop.
93. See 408 U.S. at 330-32.
94. Id. at 358-59, 369.
95. Id. at 342.
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lation, rehabilitation, and deterrence. 96 Based on the statistical evi-
dence produced by the petitioners Marshall concludes that they had
met their burden having shown through clear and convincing evidence
that capital punishment is not a greater deterrent to murder than life
imprisonment. 9 7 Also, incarceration for life can be equally effective in
serving the purpose of incapacitating particular offenders. Obviously,
capital punishment contributes nothing toward the goal of rehabilita-
tion. In order to hold the death penalty unconstitutionally excessive,
Justice Marshall rejects retribution as a permissible purpose of punish-
ment. "Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly con-
demned as intolerable aspirations for a government in a free society." 98
According to Marshall, the retributive notion of just desserts is appropri-
ate only to initially justify punishing criminals. Once a person has been
convicted of a crime, and has thereby become deserving of some punish-
ment, the extent and nature of the punishment must be determined by
some other utilitarian goal. "At times a cry is heard that morality re-
quires vengeance to evidence society's abhorrence of the act. But the
Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves." 99
Marshall also rejects capital punishment under the fourth prong of his
test - rejection by contemporary public opinion. The key to this con-
clusion is that Marshall regards the relevant public opinion to be an
informed public opinion. Legislative authorization of capital punishment
and public opinion polls in its support, do not, he argues, reveal in-
formed opinion and so are irrelevant. Marshall hypothesizes that if the
public knew that capital punishment is not a more effective deterrent
than life imprisonment, that it is applied in a discriminatory manner,
that murderers are rarely recidivists and usually have good records
while in prison, then the American public would reject capital punish-
ment. 1° ° Marshall argues that executions are too infrequent and too
concentrated on the poor and powerless sectors of society to make people
aware of the moral issues relating to capital punishment. In Furman,
because the usual indicators of public opinion had been warped, and the
relevant information had been brought to the consciousness of the
96. Id. at 343 (citing Brennan's concurrence in Trop, 356 U.S. at 111).
97. 408 U.S. at 353.
98. 408 U.S. at 343.
99. Id. at 344-345.
100. Id. at 362-369. Sarat and Vidmar attempted to test the Marshall hypothesis empiri-
cally. Their study found that: (1) a majority of the public is uninformed about capital pun-
ishment; (2) the information which Marshall argues would change people's minds would in
fact convince a large number of people to reject capital punishment; and (3) to the extent that
public support for capital punishment is based on a desire for retribution, increased informa-
tion would not change people's minds. Sarat and Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty and
the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 171.
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Court, it was the Court's duty to apply the moral principles which the
people could not apply for themselves.' 0 '
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman 102 is in some respects
similar to Justice Marshall's. Like Marshall, Brennan first identifies
protection of human dignity as the central value underlying the cruel
and unusual punishments clause. His opinion then diverges from Mar-
shall's as he applies a four factor cumulative analysis in order to deter-
mine whether capital punishment violates the dignity principle.'
0 3
First, he considers the enormity or severity of the punishment, including
its pain, both physical and psychological, and its irrevocability. Second,
he considers the procedural regularity or arbitrariness with which the
punishment is inflicted, reasoning that the anomolous infliction of harsh
penalties is one of the evils that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause was designed to prevent. 0 4 Brennan asserts that frequent, regu-
lar application of a penalty is strong evidence that it is not unconstitu-
tionally cruel. Third, Brennan considers the acceptability of the
punishment to contemporary society, measuring acceptance by usage,
not by statutory authorization. And fourth, he considers whether the
punishment is excessive or unnecessary, since a punishment cannot com-
port with the dignity principle if it involves the pointless infliction of
suffering.
In order for punishment to be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment
under Brennan's analysis, it need not run afoul of any single element of
his test. All four elements move on independent sliding scales.' 0 5 As a
punishment approaches unconstitutionality on one scale, it takes less
from the other elements to invalidate the challenged punishment. Jus-
tice Brennan does not describe explicitly the weight to be accorded to
each element or how to do the complicated analytical calculus required
by this approach.'
0 6
101. "So long as the capital sanction is used only against the forlorn, easily forgotten
members of society, legislators are content to maintain the status quo." 408 U.S. at 366. This
argument is reminiscent of the ideology of Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 & n.4
(1938).
102. 408 U.S. at 270.
103. Id. at 271-81.
104. Brennan cites the perjury trial of Titus Oates in 1685 as the incident giving birth to
the cruel and unusual punishments clause in the English Declaration of Rights. 408 U.S. at
274 n. 17. Oates had been condemned to a variety of degrading but nontorturous punish-
ments, including marching from town to town to stand in the pillory, in obedience not to
statutory authrization but to the sentencing judge's discretion. See Grannuci, supra note 1, at
856-9.
105. 408 U.S. at 282.
106. Brennan's cumulative approach makes sense because it is quite likely that a punish-
ment that affronts more than one of the constituent elements of his test is, as a whole, degrad-
ing to human dignity, even if it is not so bad when each element is considered in isolation.
Vol. 1:41, 1982
Perspectives on the Death Penalty
Applying this cumulative analysis to the death penalty, Justice Bren-
nan concludes that capital punishment is forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment. 0 7 First, he reasons that death is uniquely severe in its con-
scious infliction of physical and psychological pain, in its irrevocability,
and in its socially alienating effect upon those sentenced to die. But for
the long history of capital punishment in the United States, the sheer
severity of the death penalty would make it unconstitutional. Next, he
notes that the extreme infrequency of execution makes it highly unlikely
that the death penalty is being imposed on the few worst offenders; thus,
a presumption of arbitrariness is raised. The longstanding debate over
the morality of capital punishment, restrictions on its authorization, and
its infrequent application indicate to Justice Brennan that society seri-
ously questions the acceptability of capital punishment. It may be that
American society continues to tolerate the death penalty only because of
its disuse. In any event, there is a substantial doubt about its accept-
ance. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence of any purpose served by
capital punishment that could not be served by a lesser punishment. In
fact, the statistical evidence cited by the petitioners indicated that capi-
tal punishment is not a superior deterrent to murder than life imprison-
ment. Similarly, there is no evidence that capital punishment
contributes more to the reinforcement of the societal abhorrence of mur-
der than imprisonment, or that officially administered murder is neces-
sary to prevent citizens from resorting to lynch law, or that the people
really believe that murderers and rapists deserve to die.' 0 8
Brennan's cumulative analysis makes it easy for him to declare the
death penalty unconstitutional because it does not force him to rely on
only one element, or even to articulate how much he relies on each ele-
ment. More importantly, it automatically shifts the burden to the states
to justify capital punishment. Once Brennan concludes that the severity
of death as a punishment is almost enough to make it unconstitutional,
the petitioners need not prove much more. They must only raise sub-
stantial doubts as to. procedural fairness, community acceptance, and
utility.'0 9 Despite the difficulties associated with applying either the
The test is very difficult to apply, however, because the final conclusion must be reached by
adding apples and oranges.
107. Id. at 286-305.
108. 408 U.S. at 300-305. Brennan does not hold that retribution is a constitutionally
impermissible motivation for inflicting punishment. Instead, he argues, "The asserted public
belief that murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a
random few. As the history of the punishment of death in this country shows, our society
wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them."
408 U.S. at 304-305.
109. Although shifting the burden at first may appear to be a cheap device for achieving
a result that cannot be justified without that manipulation, it can be argued that Brennan has
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Brennan or the Marshall approach to the dignity principle, both Jus-
tices have made large contributions to Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence by identifying the violation of human dignity as a central element
of the concept of cruelty and by attempting to identify the constituent
elements of human dignity.
One salient characteristic of the activist opinions discussed here is the
Justices' willingness to use intuition and human experience as decision-
making tools. 1 0 Yet, a particular problem with the cruel and unusual
punishment cases, and with the death penalty cases in particular, is
most Justices' refusal to exercise such intuitive judgement. Judges are
human beings who must draw on their experience to solve problems.
Emotional responses are not enough; their conclusions must be sup-
ported by reasons. For Supreme Court Justices, intuitive antipathy for
the death penalty cannot be a stopping point. But this does not mean
that human feeling is irrelevant to judicial decision-making. It is a nec-
essary starting point when dealing with the moral problems posed by
the Eighth Amendment. Perhaps one reason for the Court's difficulty
with these cases is that issues of life and death are so emotionally
charged. The Justices are conscious that their emotions may play a
much greater role in capital punishment cases than in other constitu-
tional controversies. As a result they deny the relevance of their intui-
shifted the burden correctly - that the harsher the punishment, the stricter the level of scru-
tiny. Where the ultimate sanction is concerned, little leeway should be left for experiments.
Killing erroneously is so horrible that we cannot afford to wait for absolutely conclusive proof
that death is not a superior deterrent, if early returns indicate that killing does not fulfill its
asserted function. See Radin, supra note 20, at 1024-25, 1048.
110. Justice Marshall clearly describes this judicial role in replying to Justice Powell's
criticism that Marshall was merely speculating about what an informed public would believe:
Mr. Justice Powell himself concedes that judges somehow know that certain punishments
are no longer acceptable in our society; for example, he refers to branding and pillorying.
Whence comes this knowledge? The answer is that it comes from our intuition as human
beings that our fellow human beings will no longer tolerate such punishments.
I agree wholeheartedly with the implication in my Brother Powell's opinion that judges
are not free to strike down penalties that they find personally offensive. But, I disagree
with his suggestion that it is improper for judges to ask themselves whether a specific
punishment is morally acceptable to the American public. Contrary to some current
thought, judges have not lived lives isolated from a broad range of human experience.
They have come into contact with many people, many ways of life, and many philoso-
phies. They have learned to share with their fellow human beings common views of
morality. If, after drawing on this experience and considering that vast range of people
and views that they have encountered, judges conclude that these people would not
knowingly tolerate a specific penalty in light of its costs, then this conclusion is entitled to
weight (citation omitted).
I cannot agree that the American people have been so hardened, so embittered, that
they want to take the life of one who performs even the basest criminal act knowing that
the execution is nothing more than bloodlust. This has not been my experience with my
fellow citizens. Rather, I have found that they earnestly desire their system of punish-
ments to make sense in order that it can be a morally justifiable system. 408 U.S. at 369-
370 n. 163.
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tive responses, even as a starting point for analysis, in an effort to refrain
from constitutionalizing their emotional preferences.
The Justices need not be so afraid that their emotional responses will
taint the process of constitutional adjudication. One. purpose of pub-
lished opinions is to force the Justices to explain to themselves and to the
people the reasons for their conclusions. Courts, and especially the
Supreme Court, do not announce naked conclusions like criminal juries.
They must explain themselves, and the explanation is part of the con-
templative process of adjudication. The fact that human emotion pro-
duces the first glimmer of a correct answer to a problem in a judge's
mind does not invalidate the answer. If ajudge's intuition is so incorrect
that it cannot be legitimated by reason the judge should be forced, in
the course of writing a convincing opinion, to change his or her mind.
And if the judge's thought processes are so out of tune with the people
that the opinion is unconvincing or nonsensical, the Court can be per-
suaded to change its mind in later cases, or, in an extreme case, the
decision may be reversed by constitutional amendment.
IV. Conclusion
If the Supreme Court is to give any strong meaning to the cruel and
unusual punishments clause it must approach the problems presented
by that clause independently, as some of the Justices discussed above
have attempted to do. The questions that need to be answered are diffi-
cult and the ground is unfamiliar. The prohibition of cruelty is a moral
concept which makes the Justices uncomfortable. Discomfort often
breeds avoidance. In the case of the Eighth Amendment discussions this
takes the form of excessively mechanical tests intended to be "objective"
and procedural requirements lacking internal consistency (and which,
even if consistent, are irrelevant to the core question of defining cruelty).
Particularly in the death penalty cases, the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause demands a decision-making process that does not shy away
from moral problems, but confronts them. Such a process must identify
the underlying moral principles and apply these rationally to solve the
problems presented.
The Court must engage in this moral problem-solving process for sev-
eral reasons. First, the victims of cruel and unusual punishment are
powerless to protect themselves in the political forums of government.
Leaving aside the question of racial or class prejudice, the victims are
politically powerless because they are criminals. They are socially devi-
ant. They are despised, feared, and loathed by the majority. As Justice
Marshall argued in Furman, penalties which affect only the powerless
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members of society are not likely to be changed by legislatures.1 1 In
fact legislators, desperate to respond to constituents terrified of crime
and demanding a solution, are quite likely to authorize harsh penalties
even knowing them to be excessive. Only the courts, which are not di-
rectly responsible to the electorate, have a chance of giving effect to the
cruel and unusual punishments clause in the face of legislation favoring
harsher treatment of criminals.
The special contemplative role of the judiciary further justifies, and
indeed necessitates, active judicial interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Because judges must give reasons for their decisions categorizing
penalties as unconstitutionally cruel, the adjudicative process becomes
one of clarifying social values. Legislatures:
are not ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the
meaning of constitutional values, but instead see their primary function in
terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people - what
they want and what they believe should be done.'
1 2
The legislative process works through compromises, not through reason
or principle. Legislatures make decisions prescribing extensive intru-
sions on the personal liberty of convicted persons, but they do not give
reasons for their actions. The Eighth Amendment poses a variety of
difficult moral dilemmas: Is the state ever justified in taking a life? Is
retribution a permissible purpose of criminal sanctions? Is violent crime
always worse than nonviolent crime? Given the uncertainty of the be-
havioral sciences, how much extra punishment should we inflict to make
sure that crime is deterred? Which experiments with new punishments
are too intrusive to try?
Legislative decisions prescribing criminal penalties merely assume an-
swers to these and similar questions. Given the ultimate personal intru-
sion caused by the death penalty, the cruel and unusual punishments
clause demands answers that result from contemplation, not from as-
sumption. That is the responsibility of the judicial process. Arguments
are heard presenting both the state's justification of the punishment and
the defendant's objections. The court must reply with an opinion set-
ting forth not only its conclusion but the reasons behind it. The judge's
reasoning may stimulate further debate in other decision-making fo-
rums. Thus, the court may become involved in a dialogue which clari-
fies public values. Other decision-makers participate in the values-
clarification process associated with the concept of cruelty by passing
new statutes, by amending existing statutes, or even by defying the
111. 408 U.S. at 366.
112. Fiss, supra note 4 at 10.
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court. Others set the agenda by determining which cases come to court.
But the essential role courts must play is to focus the debate by explain-
ing their reasoning. As discussed above, the procedural opinions fail, in
part because the reasoning set forth in the opinions leads legislatures to
ask the wrong questions. The Court must find the strength to honestly
address the moral questions at the heart of the Eighth Amendment.
